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Abstract
Background: Although there is rapid progress in vaccine research regarding influenza pandemic
vaccines it is expected that pandemic influenza vaccine production can only start once the pandemic
virus has been recognized. Therefore, pandemic vaccine capacity will be limited at least during the
first phase of an influenza pandemic, requiring vaccine prioritization strategies. WHO recommends
developing preliminary priorities for pandemic vaccine use. The goal of this review is to provide a
thorough overview of pandemic vaccine prioritization concepts in the 27 European Union (EU)
member states and the four non-EU countries of the Global Health Security Action Group.
Methods: Between September and December 2006 data was collected for each country through
two data sources: (i) the national influenza pandemic plan; (ii) contacting key persons involved in
pandemic planning by email and/or phone and/or fax
Results: Twenty-six (84%) countries had established at least one vaccine priority group. Most
common reported vaccine priority groups were health care workers (HCW) (100%), essential
service providers (ESP) (92%) and high risk individuals (HRI) (92%). Ranking of at least one vaccine
priority group was done by 17 (65%) of 26 countries. Fifteen (88%) of these 17 countries including
a ranking strategy, decided that HCW with close contact to influenza patients should be vaccinated
first; in most countries followed and/or ranked equally by ESP and subsequently HRI. Rationales for
prioritization were provided by 22 (85%) of 26 countries that established vaccine priority groups.
There was large variation in the phrasing and level of detailed specification of rationales. Seven
(32%) of 22 countries providing rationales clearly associated each vaccine priority group with the
specific rationale. Ten (32% of the 31 countries studied) countries have consulted and involved
ethical experts to guide decisions related to vaccine prioritization.
Conclusion: In the majority of the countries the establishment of vaccine priority groups, ranking
and underlying rationales are in line with WHO recommendations. In most public plans the criteria
by which prioritized groups are identified are not easily recognizable. Clarity however, may be
necessary to assure public acceptability of the prioritization. Ethical experts, results of modelling
exercises could play an increasing role in the future decision making process.
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Background
In 2005, WHO has strongly recommended to its member
states to develop or update their national influenza pan-
demic preparedness plan [1]. Mitigating the potential
impact of an influenza pandemic may be accomplished
by non-pharmaceutical (e.g. closing schools, using face-
masks, social distancing) and pharmaceutical interven-
tions such as use of antiviral drugs and pandemic vaccines
[2]. WHO coordinates global scientific research and devel-
opment to ensure that antiviral drugs and pandemic vac-
cines are rapidly and widely available and that scientific
understanding of the virus evolves quickly [3]. While pan-
demic vaccine production can only start once the pan-
demic virus has been recognized, pandemic vaccine
capacity will be limited at least during the first phase of
the pandemic [4]. The distribution of limited and progres-
sively available vaccine supply will require strategies for
vaccine prioritization, i.e. a concept defining which
group(s) of people shall receive the pandemic vaccine first
[5].
Considerations for vaccine prioritization will be different
for each country, not only because of differences in vac-
cine availability and resources for administration of vac-
cine, but also because of differences in population
structure and the organization of essential services [6].
However, differences in vaccine priority groups between
neighbouring countries may lead to difficulties in imple-
mentation, especially when rationales underlying the con-
cepts are not clearly communicated. Germany in
particular has not less than 9 bordering countries. While
the federal public health institute in Germany, the Robert
Koch Institute (RKI) was approaching the neighbouring
countries to learn about their strategies for vaccine priori-
tization, other countries also expressed their interest to
have an overview of pandemic vaccine priorities interna-
tionally.
Recent reviews of pandemic preparedness assessments
have been published that either briefly highlighted vac-
cine prioritization among several aspects of pandemic
preparedness or provided aggregated data on vaccine pri-
oritization in multiple developed and developing coun-
tries [7-9]. The goal of this review is to provide a thorough
overview of pandemic vaccine prioritization concepts in
the 27 European Union (EU) member states and the four
non-EU countries of the Global Health Security Action
Group (GHSAG).
Methods
We explored the status of establishing pandemic influ-
enza vaccine prioritization concepts in the 27 EU coun-
tries as of January 1st 2007 and the remaining non-EU
countries belonging to the GHSAG (Canada, Japan, Mex-
ico, United States). Between September and December
2006 we obtained information through the two following
data sources: (i) for each country we first identified the
national influenza pandemic plan available in the public
domain. If the original or translated version was pub-
lished in English, Danish, Dutch, French, German, or
Swedish we extracted data directly. Otherwise we only
obtained information through the second data source; (ii)
for every country we contacted key persons involved in
pandemic planning by either email and/or phone and/or
fax.
We investigated the following questions:
(1) Does the country has a list of pandemic vaccine prior-
ity groups?
(2) Are pandemic vaccine priority groups ranked?
(3) What is the rationale for the pandemic vaccine priori-
tization concept?
(4) Were ethical committees involved in the establish-
ment of the vaccine prioritization concept?
(5) Which types of institutions were involved in the devel-
opment of vaccine priority groups?
Reported vaccine priority groups were first assigned to the
following main categories that were similar to those in the
guidelines from WHO [6]: 1) Health care workers (HCW);
2) Persons employed in positions that are essential for the
maintenance of the infrastructure and public safety
("essential service providers"; ESP); 3) Individuals with
high risk of death and severe complications ("high risk
individuals"; HRI); 4) Healthy adults and children. We
also categorized listed subgroups into these four main cat-
egories when applicable. Other groups that could not be
assigned to one of these four main categories were listed
in a separate table.
Similarly, the rationales for the vaccine prioritization con-
cept chosen, were grouped into four categories which were
again compatible with guidelines provided by the WHO
[6]: 1) To reduce morbidity and mortality; 2) To maintain
infrastructure, including functioning of the health care
system; 3) To limit social disruption; 4) To limit eco-
nomic losses. There was large variation in the phrasing
and level of detailed specification of rationales. However,
we attempted to put the reported rationales in the most
appropriate category.
In December 2006 all identified key persons received a
draft version of the tables included in this review and were
able to comment on correct representation of their coun-BMC Public Health 2007, 7:236 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/236
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try and permission to publish the country specific data.
Abbreviations can be found at the end of the manuscript.
Results
Vaccine priority groups
Except for Malta, the countries included in this review had
a National Pandemic Influenza Plan published on the
internet [see Additional file 1]. The language of the pan-
demic plans of all but seven countries (CY, FI, LV, MX, PT,
RO, SI) were available in English, Danish, Dutch, French,
German or Swedish and allowed direct extraction of the
information.
Representatives from all 31 (100%) countries responded
to our request for either updated or additional informa-
tion on the information reported in the National Pan-
demic Influenza Plans available in public domain during
the study period. Furthermore, representatives of 30
(98%) countries either confirmed the correctness or pro-
vided changes to the representation of their countries'
data on the draft tables and the US referred to the infor-
mation available in the public domain.
At least 19 (61%) countries (AT, BG, CA, CY, DE, DK, EE,
FI, HU, IE, IT, JP, LT, MT, NL, PT, SE, UK, US) reported
that ultimately the whole population shall be immunized
with the pandemic vaccine. For countries that included
"healthy adults and children" in their vaccine priority
groups it was inferred that they are also planning to finally
immunize the entire population. However, because vac-
cine will likely become progressively available while the
pandemic has already started all but one (PT) of these 19
countries have already defined vaccine priority groups. A
general statement frequently reported by the countries'
representatives was that vaccine priority groups had been
established to stimulate planning prior to a pandemic, but
that these will be continually revised in light of new infor-
mation that will be learnt once the pandemic virus is iden-
tified.
Except for Belgium, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico and Por-
tugal twenty-six (84%) countries had established at least
one vaccine priority group. Denmark and Greece did not
list vaccine priority groups as such, but mentioned them
as groups reflecting a discussion part in the National Pan-
demic Plan (DK) or as "suggested" (GR). We included
information from these two countries in the description
of vaccine priority groups in the 26 countries. Four of the
five countries without defined vaccine priority groups
may still do so as discussion about determining them was
still ongoing (BE, PT), or may be established in the
updated National Plan (LV) or when more information
about vaccine production and availability is accessible
(MX). (Table 1) Only Luxembourg will not determine any
vaccine priority groups in advance of the pandemic. The
number of vaccine priority groups as categorized by the
countries varied from one to eight. This wide range is
mainly due to differences in the level of detail in the defi-
nition of the specific vaccine priority groups. However,
most of these vaccine priority groups could be categorized
into HCW, ESP, HRI and "healthy adults and children".
Among the 26 countries that defined vaccine priority
groups 23 (88%) agreed to prioritize HCW, ESP and HRI
(Table 1). There were three exceptions: Finland (HCW
only), Germany (HCW and ESP) and the Netherlands
(HCW and HRI).
Thus, HCW were included as vaccine priority group in all
these 26 countries. Cyprus specified "individuals involved
with the distribution of vaccines and antivirals" as one
vaccine priority group and "people working in essential
services" as another vaccine priority group. This latter
group may by definition include HCW but specific infor-
mation about subgroups was not available (Table 1). The
most common subgroups specifically listed under HCW
included paramedics, ambulance and emergency services
as well as in-patient health care workers (Table 2).
Except for Finland and the Netherlands, ESP  were
included as vaccine priority group by 24 (92%) of 26
countries that had established at least one vaccine priority
group. Identified subgroups belonging to this category
were e.g. key persons in government, emergency response,
defence and security as well as in the public sector (for
example utility workers, Table 2).
Only Finland and Germany did not include HRI as vac-
cine priority group, thus HRI were included by 24 (92%)
of the 26 countries. In many countries the definition of
this group is very similar to the one used for seasonal
influenza recommendations, but not all countries specifi-
cally listed all subgroups in this context. Of note, six coun-
tries (BG, CA, DK, IE, NL, UK) report specifically that the
exact types of risk group will need to be identified during
the pandemic (through investigations, studies or surveil-
lance).
Healthy adults and children were included as one or two
vaccine priority groups by 13 (50%) countries (BG, CA,
CY, DK, ES, IE, IT, JP, MT, NL, SE, UK, US), including 3
countries (DK, IE, UK) that intend to "offer vaccination to
all individuals not belonging to any other vaccine priority
group". Estonia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia reported
to vaccinate children (and not healthy adults) as they con-
sidered them to belong to HRI.
Other vaccine priority groups have been established in
11 (42%) of 26 countries (EE, GR, IE, IT, JP, MT, RO, SE,
SK, UK, US). However, partially they represent just an
extension of the above named first three main groupsB
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Table 1: Establishment of Vaccine Priority Groups in EUA and GSHAGB countries
Countries Source(s) data abstraction 
included in this review
No. of main 
groups
Presence of list of 
subgroups within 3 
main groups 
(Table 2)
Ranking of 
groups
Ethic 
committees/
consultant 
involved
Intention to vac-
cinate whole 
populationC
Pandemic vaccine priority groupsD
Pandemic 
plan
Email 
fax
Phone (1) Healthcare 
workers
(2) Essential 
service providers
(3) High risk 
individuals
(4) Healthy adults 
and childrenE
Other (Table 3) F
ATA yes yes yes 3 no1a no yes1b yes yes yes yes no no
BEA yes yes yes discussion not applicable not applicable no unknown
BGA yes yes no 3 yes yes noI yes3 yes yes yes yes no
CAB,2 yes yes no 5H yes yes noI yes yes yes yes yes no
CYA noG yes no 5H unknown yes yes yes partly4 yes yes yes no
CZA, yes yes5 no 3 yes unknown unknown unknown yes yes yes no no
DKA,6 yes yes yes 7H yes yes, 2 groups6 no yes yes yes yes yesJ no
EEA yes yes no 3 yes yes noI yes yes yes yes partlyK yes
FIA,7 noG yes no 17 unknown yes, 1 group7 yes yes yes7 no7 no7 no no
FRA,B,8 yes yes yes 3 no no no unknown yes yes yes no no
DEA,B yes yes yes 29a no9b yes no yes yes yes no no no
GRA,10 yes yes no 510 unknown discussion10 yes unknown yes10 yes10 yes10 no yes10
HUA yes yes no 3 no yes no yes yes yes yes no no
IEA yes yes no 7H yes yes noI yes yes yes yes yesJ yes
ITA,B yes yes no 6H yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
JPB,11 yes yes yes 6H discussion discussion no yes yes yes yes yes yes
LVA,12 noG yes no 012 not applicable not applicable unknown unknown
LTA,13 yes yes no 4 yes discussion no yes yes yes yes no no
LUA yes no yes 0 not applicable not applicable unknown unknown
MTA no14a yes no 8H14b no yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
MXB,15 noG yes no 0 not applicable not applicable yes unknown
POA,16 yes yes no 2 yes no unknown unknown yes yes yes partlyK no
PTA noG yes no discussion unknown discussion yes yes
ROA noG yes no 5 yes yes yes unknown yes yes yes partlyK yes
SKA yes yes no 4 yes no no unknown yes yes yes no yes
SIA noG yes no 4 no yes noI unknown yes yes yes partlyK no
ESA yes yes no 4H discussion yes no discussion yes yes yes yes no
SEA yes yes no 7H no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
NLA yes yes yes 4H yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no
UKA,B,17 yes yes no 7H yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yesJ yes
USB,18 yes no yes 4H yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Summary 23/31 
(74%)
29/31 
(94%)
9/31 
(29%)
26/31 (84%) 14/26 (54%) 17/26 (65%) 10/31 (32%) 19/31 (61%) 26/26 (100%) 24/26 (92%) 24/26 (92%) 13/26 (50%) 11/26 (42%)
A Member State of European Union (EU); B Member of Global Health Security Action Group (GSHAG); C 'yes'indicates that either National Pandemic Plan specifically reports the aim to vaccinate whole population and/or National Pandemic Plan includes 'healthy 
adults and children' as one of the vaccine priority group(s) and/or country representatives specifically reported this information; 'discussion' indicates country representative specifically reported that vaccination policy is still under discussion, 'unknown' indicates that 
this item is not specifically reported; D The issue of prioritisation arises only in the situation of vaccine shortage or when vaccines become available over time; E 'yes refers to those countries either specifying 'healthy adults and children' as vaccine priority group(s) 
and those countries reporting 'offer to all' as vaccine priority group; F Vaccine priority groups that could not be categorized in the four most common vaccine priority groups as described in this table; G National Pandemic Plan available in public domain in language 
other than English, Danish, Dutch, French, German or Swedish; H Including a category referring to vaccination of whole population; I Ethics considerations will be involved in the future; J Included under the vaccine priority group 'offer to all'; K Countries have included 
'children' under 'high risk individuals'
1a (AT) National Pandemic Plan serves as a framework to guide each of the nine states to develop specific plan including vaccine priority subgroups; 1b No specific ethical committee involved but ethical considerations have been involved;
2 (CA) Advancements in knowledge and technology are currently being considered by the Pandemic Vaccine Working group and may result in the revision of vaccine priority groups in updated Pandemic Plan in 2007
3 (BG) Specified in draft national influenza preparedness plan of Bulgaria as "aim is to cover gradually the maximum part of the population";
4 (CY) Specified as people working in the Health Sector involved with the distribution of vaccines and antivirals;
5 (CZ) Information received by email is from the unpublished National Pandemic Plan of the Czech Republic 2006;
6 (DK) Prioritisation of vaccine strategies will be decided during the course of a pandemic, the information in the table reflects the discussion paper in the pandemic plan;
7 (FI) Irrespective of the virus one vaccine priority group is determined in advance;
8 (FR) Working groups are updating strategies using pre-pandemic modelling but also accurate survey of the population and age-groups most affected by virus, associated with models of progressive availability of the vaccine in relation with the kinetics of a pandemic 
will determine the vaccine priority groups;
9a (DE) Two main vaccine priority groups have been determined, discussion related to criteria of establishing further vaccine priority groups are under discussion 9b National Plan serves as a framework to guide each of the 16 states to develop specific plan including 
vaccine priority subgroups.
10 (GR) Is in the process of discussing and further refining vaccine priority groups, the information in the table includes "suggested priority groups" as published in National Pandemic Plan;
11 (JP) Prioritisation is under discussion and the table includes information in draft guidelines available for public discussion and comments;
12 (LV) Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan of Latvia will be updated in 2007;
13 (LT) Vaccine priority groups will be revised in the "near future" [as of October 26th 2006];
14a (MT) National Influenza Pandemic Standing Committee has decided on vaccine priority groups and currently the plan prepared by this committee is being approved and amended by the Director General; 14b Seven of eight reported vaccine priority groups have 
been categorized under four main categories included in this table;
15 (MX) Current National Preparedness and Response Plans does not include a scenario in which pandemic vaccine is available; this aspect may be updated as information on vaccine production and availability becomes available.
16 (PL) More specific and detailed strategy under discussion;
17 (UK) Plan is currently under revision, including more modelling of immunisation strategies;
18 (US) Revision of order prioritisation of tiers is expected in spring 2007.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:236 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/236
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(HCW, ESP, HRI) for example long term care facility resi-
dents (RO) may overlap with HRI and selected industries
may overlap with ESP (IE, UK). Other groups defined
were e.g. staff of workplaces where many people gather
(SK), household contacts of immunocomprised persons
(SK, US), pandemic vaccine manufacturers (RO, US) and
a 'wild card' selected age groups based on National or
WHO recommendations as reported by three countries
(IE, MT, UK) (Table 3).
Priority ranking
Ranking of at least one vaccine priority group was done by
17 (65%) of 26 countries (BG, CA, CY, DE, DK, EE, IE, FI,
HU, IT, MT, NL, RO, SI, ES, UK, US) which had estab-
lished at least one vaccine priority group.
Fifteen (88%) (BG, CA, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, HU, IE, IT, MT,
RO, SI, UK, US) of these 17 countries decided that HCW
with close contact to influenza patients should be vacci-
nated first; in most countries (BG, CA, EE, ES, DE, HU, IE,
IT, MT, UK) followed and/or ranked equally by ESP and
subsequently HRI (BG, CA, EE, ES, IE, IT, UK) (Table 4).
Except for the very young children which might receive
vaccination because they belong to the seasonal influenza
vaccination group, children and healthy adults are not
ranked at the top in any of the countries. However, in
Japan, a discussion on the ranking of children is ongoing
and will depend on the chosen rationale being either to
prevent severe cases from dying or "to save people consid-
ering future life" (email communication). At the time of
writing, ranking was either under discussion (GR, LT, JP);
information unavailable (CZ); or not done (AT, FR, PL,
SE, SK) by 9 (35%) of 26 countries that had established
vaccine priority group(s). These, and also other, countries
reported that establishment and ranking of vaccine prior-
ity groups is constantly under discussion and final deci-
Table 2: Common reported subgroups within three main vaccine priority groups as listed in National Influenza Pandemic Plans A
BG CA CZ DK EE IE IT LT PL RO SK NL UK US
Health Care Workers in: B .......X ... .X F
C l i n i c a l  l a b o r a t o r i e s ,  p h a r m a c i e s XXX. X....X .X ..6  ( 4 3 % )
P a r a m e d i c s ,  e m e r g e n c y  s e r v i c e s XXXX. XX. XX. XX. 1 0  ( 7 1 % )
R e s i d e n t i a l  c a r e  h o m e s  f o r  e l d e r l y .X ...X ......X .3  ( 2 1 % )
S o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ( e . g .  d a y  c a r e ,  " e l d e r l y  h o u s e s " ) X .X X ......X ...4  ( 2 9 % )
P u b l i c  h e a l t h  a g e n c i e s / a u t h o r i t i e s XXX. X. X. . X. . . . 6  ( 4 3 % )
L o n g  t e r m  h e a l t h  c a r e  f a c i l i t i e s .X X ...X .X .X X ..6  ( 4 3 % )
O u t - p a t i e n t  h e a l t h  c a r e  f a c i l i t i e s XXXX. . X. . X. X. . 7  ( 5 0 % )
I n - p a t i e n t  h e a l t h  c a r e  f a c i l i t i e s XXXX. XX. XX. XX. 1 0  ( 7 1 % )
Essential service providers B
Key persons in government, emergency response, defence 
and security
XXX C XD .X E ..X :X .X E X
P o l i c e XXX. XXX. XXX. X. 1 0  ( 7 1 % )
A r m e d  f o r c e s XXX. XXX. XXX. X. 1 0  ( 7 1 % )
F i r e  f i g h t e r s XXX. . XX. XXX. X. 1 0  ( 7 1 % )
G o v e r n m e n t X X X ......X X ..X 6  ( 4 3 % )
E m e r g e n c y  r e s p o n s e  d e c i s i o n  m a k e r s X X ..X .X X .....X 6  ( 4 3 % )
B o r d e r  g u a r d s  a n d  c u s t o m  o f f i c e r s X ...X .X .X X ....5  ( 3 6 % )
Defined national authorities X X . 2 (14%)
Public Sector XC ....X X E .. . . X D
U t i l i t y  w o r k e r s  ( e . g .  p o w e r ,  w a t e r ,  s e w a g e  s y s t e m ) XXX. XXXX. XX. XX1 1  ( 7 9 % )
F u n e r a l  s e r v i c e s / m o r t u a r y  p e r s o n n e l X X ...X ...X ..X X 6  ( 4 3 % )
T r a n s p o r t  ( e . g .  f u e l ,  w a t e r ,  f o o d ,  m e d i c a l  s u p p l i e s ) X X X ...X .XXX. X8  ( 5 7 % )
High risk individuals B
Groups identified in pandemic as being at increased 
risk for complications
X X .X .X .....X X .6  ( 4 3 % )
Sub-groups similar to those where vaccination is 
recommended during seasonal influenza
XXX. XXXXXXXXXX1 3  ( 9 3 % )
P r e g n a n t  w o m e n .X ..X ...X ....X 4  ( 2 9 % )
P r e g n a n t  w o m e n  i n  t h e  t h i r d  t r i m e s t e r .....X .X ...X X .4  ( 2 9 % )
Children 6 to 23 months . X . . . X X . . X . . . X 4 (29%)
C h i l d r e n  a n d  y o u t h  6  m o n t h s  t o  1 8  y e a r s ....X ...X .....2  ( 1 4 % )
A Table includes countries which listed subgroups in their published National Pandemic Influenza Plans that either met the language criteria (see Methods) or provided detailed 
information on request; B Due to countries variation in the terminology among countries overlaps between subgroups may exist. Table includes subgroups if categorized by 
countries as belonging to one of the main groups; C National Pandemic Influenza Plan reports a comprehensive list of subgroups which is not completely summarized in this 
table; D National Pandemic Influenza Plan reports a comprehensive list of groups which could be considered and is not summarized in this table. "Decisions on priority groups 
will be made when the characteristics of the new pandemic virus is known and according to ongoing work on vulnerability in specific key sectors"; E Unmarked subgroups are 
not necessarily excluded because the National Pandemic Influenza Plan only reports a few examples; F No further specification.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:236 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/236
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sion will depend on the specific epidemiological
characteristics of the new pandemic virus and the pan-
demic vaccine availability.
Rationales
Except for the Czech Republic, Japan, Poland and the Slo-
vak Republic rationales for prioritization were provided
by 22 (85%) of 26 countries that established vaccine pri-
ority groups (Table 5). There was large variation in the
phrasing and level of detailed specification of rationales.
However, we attempted to put the reported rationales in
the most appropriate category.
The category "To reduce morbidity and mortality"
included rationales reported by 21 (95%) of 22 countries
that reported any rationale, only Cyprus did not report
this rationale. The general non-specific rationale "to
reduce morbidity and mortality" was reported by 10
(45%) of 22 countries (AT, BG, CA, DK, DE, ES, IE, RO, SI,
UK); and the rationale "to prevent illness in the general
population" was also reported by 4 (AT, CA, DK, UK) of
these 10 countries and by 3 other countries (FI, NL, US)
not specifically reporting the general rationale. We
included the rationale "to save years of life" as reported by
Finland also under this general category. We further
dichotomized this category into "directly" and "indi-
rectly" as morbidity and mortality can be reduced through
vaccinating the respective group of persons (direct protec-
tion) or by vaccinating those who could transmit the virus
to them (indirect protection). For example 10 countries
(BG, CA, DK, FR, LT, MT, NL, SE, UK, US) gave direct pro-
tection as (one of) the underlying rationale(s) for their
prioritization of persons considered to be most vulnerable
to severe illness. Three countries (CA, SI, UK) intend to
prevent transmission to the general population and mini-
mal four countries (DK, DE; SI, UK) to high risk individu-
als by vaccinating those individuals most likely to
transmit the virus to them.
The category "To maintain infrastructure and health care
system" includes rationales reported by all 22 countries
that provided rationales (AT, BG, CA, CY, DE, DK, EE, ES,
FI, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, MT, NL, RO, SI, SE, UK, US).
These were divided into two broad categories: mainte-
nance of the work force and maintenance of essential
community services. The latter was specified by overall 19
countries and compromised for example maintenance of
the essential health service response (14 countries: CA,
DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HU, IT, MT, NL, RO, SE, UK, US) and
maintenance of the infrastructure to implement the pan-
Table 3: List of vaccine priority groups other than health care workers, essential service providers, high risk individuals and healthy 
adults/children
EE GR IE IT JP MT RO SK SE UK US N = 11 (100%)
Reported by countries as specific vaccine priority group
Long term care facility residentsA X 1 (9%)
Individuals living in "closed communities" (e.g. nursing 
homes)A
.X 1 .... . . . 1  ( 9 % )
Individuals in crowding area (e.g. schools). X 1 .... . . . . . 1  ( 9 % )
Staff of workplaces where many people gather (e.g. 
banks, shops)
. . .... . X . . . 1  ( 9 % )
"Selected age groups, depending on national and/or 
WHO advice"B
. . X . X . . . X . 3 (27%)
Selected industries (e.g. pharmaceuticals)C . . X . . . . . X . 2 (18%)
(Sub) groups not clearly categorized as belonging to main 
groups
Pandemic vaccine manufacturersD .. . X 2 .. X 4 ... X 5 3 (27%)
Household contacts of immunocompromised personsE . . . . . . . X . . X 2 (18%)
Household contacts of high-risk patients X . . . . . . . X . . 2 (18%)
Household contacts of children . . . . . . . . . . X 1 (9%)
Seniors X3 1 (9%)
A Specified as additional vaccine priority group to the "high risk individuals"; while in other countries these individuals may be included 
in seasonal vaccination group; B Vaccination policy might be revised in the event of one or more age groups being more severely 
affected in a pandemic; C Reported as separate vaccine priority group; while in other countries these individuals might have been 
included, but had not been listed, under the "essential workers"; D Countries have specifically reported this (sub) group while in other 
countries these might have been included, but had not been listed, under "essential workers"; E This category also includes "family 
members of persons with impaired immunity" (SK); 1 Currently in the process of discussing and refining further priority groups, 
information in the table includes "suggested" priority groups as published in the National Pandemic Plan; 2 Not listed in National 
Pandemic Plan, but updated information received from country representative; 3 Reported as separate vaccine priority groups in draft 
guidelines; 4 Specified as separate (1 of 6) vaccine priority group; 5 Specified as 'subtier' belonging to one of four 'tiers' and includes also 
antiviral manufacturersBMC Public Health 2007, 7:236 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/236
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Table 4: Ranking of vaccine priority groups A
Countries 1st priority 2nd priority 3rd priority 4th priority ≥5th priorities
BGB Health care workers 
Essential service 
providers
High risk individuals Healthy adults and 
children
CA Health care workers Essential service 
providers
High risk individuals Healthy adults Children
CY Health care workers 
involved with 
vaccines and antiviral 
distribution
Essential service 
providers
High risk individuals Healthy adultsC Individuals aged 2–18 yrsC
DKD High risk individuals
Health care workers
---
EEE Health care workers Essential service 
providers
High risk individuals - -
FIF H e a l t h  c a r e  w o r k e r s ----
DE Health care workers Essential service 
providers
---
HU Health care workers Essential service 
providers
IE Health care workers Essential service 
providers
High risk individuals Individuals aged > 65 
yrs.
5) Selected industries
6) Selected age groups,
7) Offer to all
IT Health care workers Essential service 
providers
High risk individuals Healthy individuals 
aged 2–18 yrs.
Healthy adults
MT Health care workers 
Essential service 
providers
Specific age groups 
with high 
complication risk
Individuals aged > 65 
yrs with chronic 
diseasesG
Individuals aged 2–64 
yrs. with chronic 
diseasesG
5)Individuals > 65 years without 
chronic disease
6) infants aged 6–24 monthsG
7) Healthy individuals aged 2–16 
yrs.G
8) Healthy adults aged 17–64 
yrs.G
RO Health care workers Vaccine 
manufacturers and 
distribution staff
Essential service 
providers
Long term care 
facilities residents
High risk individuals
SI Health care workers Workers involved in 
pandemic control
High risk individuals - -
ES Health care workers Essential service 
providers
High risk individuals Healthy adults and 
children
NLH "Highest risk" 
individuals
Health care workers Specific Pandemic 
Risk groups
Healthy adults and 
children
-
UK Health care workers Essential service 
providers
High risk individuals Individuals aged > 65 
yrs.
5) Selected industries
6) Selected age groups,
7) Offer to all
USI Vaccine and antiviral 
manufacturers Health 
care workers (Tier 
1a)
High risk individuals 
(Tier 1b)
Pregnant woman, 
household contacts 
of severely 
immunocompromise
d persons, household 
contacts of children 
(Tier 1c)
Public health 
emergency response, 
Key governmental 
leaders (Tier 1d)
5) Healthy individuals aged ≥ 65; 
individuals aged 6 months to 64 
yrs. with 1 high-risk condition; 
healthy infants aged 6–23 months 
(Tier 2a)
6) Critical infrastructure group 
(Tier 2b)
7) Offer to all
A The issue of prioritisation arises only in the situation of absolute or temporal vaccine shortage (or need for time wise stratification due to 
production time-frame); B A final decision regarding priorities will be taken under the conditions of the pandemic; C In view of the large numbers 
of persons among healthy adults and children a decision to vaccinate them will depend on the availability of vaccines, in view of the big numbers 
of persons covered by these groups; D Includes only the two vaccine priority groups who are determined as for prioritisation in advance: 
decisions on further prioritisation by one of five vaccination strategies as reported in the National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan will be 
made during the course of the pandemic; E Estonian mass vaccination policy foresees four immunization strategies of which implementation 
depends on vaccine availability; the table includes the prioritization y in two of four strategies assuming limited vaccine; F Includes the one 
vaccine priority group determined in advance; further decisions will be made when more information about the virus is available; G In the case 
that all age groups are affected similarly then these groups will be prioritised (as decided by Malta's National Influenza Pandemic Standing 
committee and currently being approved and amended by the Director General); H The Health Council Committee defined four groups of 
people that, on medical grounds are most in need of vaccination. "Group 1" will be vaccinated first; in this table this group is depicted as 'highest 
complication individuals'; the category "Specific Pandemic Risk Groups" probably shows overlap with the "Group 2–4" as defined by the Health 
Council Committee; healthy adults and children will be vaccinated when enough vaccine is available 10; I Vaccination priority groups are 
categorised into 4 tiers including subtiers which will be vaccinated with increasing availability of vaccine. Description in this table is limited to 
tear 1–2. Currently discussion is ongoing to update the ranking of vaccine priority groups.B
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Table 5: Overview of rationales considered in EU and GSHAG countries to define vaccine priority groups A
AT BG CA CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE GR HU IE IT JP LT MT PL RO SK SI ES SE NL UK US
To reduce morbidity and mortality (1) XX B X. . X E ...X . . X .. .. .X.X X .. X.
To save years of life . . . . . . . XF . . . .... . .. . . ... . .
To prevent illness in the general population X . X . . XE .X . . . .... . .. . . ..XXX
directly
- in individuals most vulnerable to severe illness . X X . . XE . . X ... . . X I X.. . . .X XXX
- in age groups most vulnerable to severe illness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X . . . . . X . . .
- in health care workers at increased exposure 
risk*
..X ..X E XXXX X X . x. . . . X . .. XX X X
indirectly
- by preventing or minimising the spread of 
infection
. X
to g e n e r a l  p o p u l a t i o n . . X. . . ... . . .... . .. . X ... X
to high risk individuals . . . . . XE ...X . . . .. .. .. .. .X . X
to immunocompromised and children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X
To maintain infrastructure and health 
care system (2)
X X ..... . . X ... X
G
.. . . . . .X .. XX
By maintaining the major work force . X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
By maintaining the essential community services . X X X . XE X .X XXX X .X X.X. X .X XXX
which may include the following specified rationales: .
maintain service to implement pandemic 
response
...X C . . X .X . . . .... . .. . X ... . X
maintain vaccine program . . X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X . . . X . . X
maintain essential health service response* . . X . . XE X X X XX.X
G
.. X. X. ..X XXX
maintain s e c u r i t y . . . . . . ... . . ...X . .. . . ... .
Limiting social disruption (3) .X ..... . . .... . . . .. .. . . . ...
Limiting economic losses (4) .X ..... . . .... . . . .. .. . . . ...
Any rationale reported? XXXXD XE XXXX X X X XH XX H X J X XXX X X
Any rationale to 1? XXX. . X E XXXX X X XX. X X . X . X XXX X X
Any rationale to 2? XXXX. X E XXXX X X XX. X X . X . X XXX X X
Any rationale to 3? .X ..... . . .... . . . .. .. . . . ...
Any rationale to 4? .X ..... . . .... . . . .. .. . . . ...
* To provide a complete overview and deal with different terminology of countries in specifying this rationale we have marked the rationale in both categories for each country specifying 
this rationale;
A Level of detailed specification of rationales varied between the countries, as a result rationales in this table may overlap; B In more detail specified as "to reduce complications, necessity of 
hospitalizations and lethality"; C Specified followed: 'Covering those who are going to be actively involved in mastering a possible pandemic'; D National Influenza Pandemic Plan includes the 
following general statement: 'Vaccine Priority groups have been established according to clear, medical, social and economic reasons'; E National Influenza Pandemic Plan describes 5 
strategies which are the basis for the different rationales to decide which vaccine groups will be prioritized; during the course of the pandemic decision will be made which strategies to 
follow; F Number of potential life years saved will be the most important determining factor for prioritization; G National Influenza Plan does not contain specific rationales, but rationales 
which set priorities as represented in this table were given through personal communication; H Rationales are under discussion; I Specified as individuals at highest risk of influenza; J National 
Influenza Pandemic plan does not contain specification of rationales for priority setting; personal communication reveals that the main principle is "to involve groups in the highest risk of 
infection, complication and death and groups in the population that are important for maintaining the public life".BMC Public Health 2007, 7:236 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/236
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demic response (5 countries: CY, EE, FR, SI, US). Mainte-
nance of the work force was named explicitly only by
Canada.
Only seven countries (BG, CA, DE, DK, IE, UK, US) clearly
associated each vaccine priority group with the specific
rationale underlying the inclusion of the specific group. At
least five countries (CY, EE, HU, RO, IT) did not specify
rationales for all established vaccine priority groups. The
inclusion of a specific vaccine priority group may be
rationalized different by countries. E.g. in Estonia and
Poland children are included under the rationale to pro-
tect high risk individuals and at least three countries (CA,
NL, US,) specifically reported that children are only vacci-
nated when sufficient vaccine is available to vaccinate the
entire population anyway. Canada intends to vaccinate
children specifically to limit spread of infection.
Decision making process
Coordination of the pandemic preparedness is in most
countries under the responsibility of the Ministry of
Health. Frequently working groups of experts or advisory
committees for vaccination advised the government in the
development of the pandemic preparedness plans. Six
countries (19%) (DE, FR, IE, NL, UK, US) have included
references to pre-pandemic modelling in their pandemic
plan and/or referred to ongoing (or, when the pandemic
has begun: real time) mathematical modelling that might
result in future changes of vaccine priority groups. Ten
(32%) of 31 countries have consulted and involved ethi-
cal experts (AT, CY, FI, GR, MX, PT, RO, SE, UK, US) to
guide decisions related to vaccine prioritization, five fur-
ther countries (16%) (BG, CA, EE, IE, SI) reported the
intent to include ethical aspects in future discussions.
Discussion
The objective of this review was to provide an overview of
pandemic vaccine priority groups in 27 EU member states
and the 4 non-EU countries that are members of the
GSHAG. We included these countries as they are part of
organized structures (e.g. Health Security Committee,
European Union) with the goal to strengthen public
health preparedness and response globally to not only
threats of biological, chemical, radio-nuclear terrorism
but also pandemic influenza [11,12]. A multinational
comparison between countries may be useful to e.g. iden-
tify large differences in prioritization between cross bor-
dering countries which may result in either
harmonisation or proactively explaining the potential dif-
ferences. For example we found a large difference in rank-
ing priority between the neighbouring countries Germany
and the Netherlands. The Netherlands is the only country
that has not top ranked health care workers but the "high-
est complication individuals"; this latter group is in Ger-
many's National Pandemic Plan, but not included as one
of the two established vaccine priority groups. However,
we do not aim to provide the most suitable prioritization
concept. We rather wish to provide an overview of
approaches in the wider European perspective and want
to discuss some general aspects in more detail. This might
help countries to put themselves into the international
context and/or to assist them should they be in the proc-
ess to formulate or overhaul pandemic vaccine prioritiza-
tions concepts.
Nineteen (61%) of the countries state that they intend to
finally vaccinate the whole population, but most admit
that progressive vaccine availability will make some form
of prioritization unavoidable. Twenty six (84%) of the 31
surveyed countries had defined vaccine priority groups
which were fairly similar. Commonly defined vaccine pri-
ority groups included HCW, ESP and HRI and are thus
consistent with WHO guidelines [6]. Approximately half
of these countries have defined subgroups among those
three main groups, some, e.g. Canada, Czech Republic
and Denmark specified many groups in great detail. This
may reflect their intention to respond to two of the major
challenges in pandemic vaccine prioritization: logistical
administration and acceptability. It seems likely that the
better priority groups are defined in advance of the pan-
demic the easier it is to identify eligible individuals or
conversely, ask those who are not or not yet eligible to
hold out to the point of time when it is their turn. Identi-
fying HCW and ESP might be possible through personal
registers. However, identification of HRI might be more
complex. While in e.g. the Netherlands those individuals
belonging to the high risk influenza complication group
are yearly invited by their general practitioner to receive
seasonal influenza vaccination, such a register has not
been established in Germany. Owing to difficulties in pri-
oritization on the basis of chronic diseases, age is often a
surrogate for identifying those at greatest risk of complica-
tions [6]. Therefore, a pragmatic solution might include
simple criteria by e.g. grouping HRI by year of birth. In
addition, early communication and transparency of prior-
itization may aid greatly in the acceptability of concepts
within the population. We did not observe a clear associ-
ation between population size and the number of estab-
lished vaccine priority groups. Austria and Germany, the
only two EU countries with a federal government, state
that the National Pandemic Plan serves as a framework to
guide the pandemic preparedness in each of the individ-
ual states. Both federal EU-countries leave the specifica-
tion of subgroups to the responsibility of the individual
states. This is in contrast to two of the three non-EU
GSHAG countries with a federal structure included in this
review. Both Canada and the USA have included extensive
lists of subgroups to guide the state health departments.
Thirteen (93%) of 14 countries that foresee prioritization
of HRI and have reported subgroups, have defined themBMC Public Health 2007, 7:236 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/236
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similarly or identically to those for whom seasonal influ-
enza vaccination is recommended, but 6 (43%) also want
to keep their flexibility to give groups priority who will be
identified in the pandemic as being at increased risk for
complications. In this context children or subgroups of
children are only covered within the HRI group. Two-
thirds (65%) of the countries having established vaccine
priority groups ranked at least one of these groups, but
also kept the flexibility to change ranking when more
information about risk groups and vaccine availability
will be accessible
Broad agreement exists among countries regarding rank-
ing of the vaccine priority groups with HCW as the first
priority, ESP as second and HRI as third, in line with
WHO recommendations [6]. None of the 14 countries
that included children as priority (sub)group, and ranked
priority groups, prioritized the vaccination of children
above the previously mentioned three groups unless they
are regarded as HRI.
Apparent discrepancies exist between WHO recommen-
dations as well as the low priority given to vaccination of
children on one hand with published results from mathe-
matical modelling on the other hand that rather favour
prioritization of children [13-15]. Ferguson et al. mod-
elled the effect of a staged vaccination programme at the
beginning of a pandemic in the USA and showed a maxi-
mum effect on the reduction of transmission if children
are vaccinated first [13]. Similarly, Germann et al. con-
cluded that schoolchildren should receive high priority
for vaccination, unless other strategies, such as closing
schools, are implemented to limit the contact rates among
children [14]. Longini et al. estimated that vaccinating
80% of the children aged less than 19 years will be almost
as effective as vaccinating 80% of the population, and this
strategy would be the most efficient use of the vaccine [15]
The 2004 publication from WHO and likely also the
working process of most pandemic plans reviewed here
preceded these publications [6]. WHO stated that there is
an absence of evidence that use of inactivated vaccine in
children will reduce the spread of a pandemic in the com-
munity. It is unclear however, if recommendations were
drastically different since a substantial reduction of trans-
mission among and from children might be achieved
through social distancing measures of children, such as
closure of schools [14]. While 6 countries (19%) have
included references to pre-pandemic modelling and/or
referred to ongoing mathematical modelling, we cannot
conclude that pre-pandemic modelling has not played a
role in the decision making in other countries because we
did not systematically ask this specific question.
Rationales for prioritization were provided by 85% of the
countries that had established vaccine priority groups. Yet
again, clearly stating the objectives and rationales of vac-
cine prioritisation will be important for acceptance in the
general population. Of note, prioritization of HCW may
be justified by three rationales: (1) to protect them
directly because they are at increased risk (reducing mor-
bidity and mortality), (2) to prevent or minimise trans-
mission to HRI (indirect reduction of morbidity and
mortality), and (3) by maintaining infrastructure and
health care system.
Ideally the goals of prioritization need to be stated clearly
and unambiguously. Meltzer et al showed that differences
in prioritization goals or rationales can result in com-
pletely different prioritization ranking [16]. E.g. if pre-
venting the greatest number of deaths is the most
important goal, adults in the working age (20–64 years
old) with the highest risk for severe illness should be vac-
cinated first. However, if maximizing economic returns is
the highest priority HRI aged 0 to 64 years should be vac-
cinated first. Also the importance of the specificity of goals
was shown by Meltzer. For example, the commonly for-
mulated goal to 'prevent deaths', is not precise enough
because different priority lists can be drawn up by using
death rates (elderly HRI) versus the total number of
deaths (working age HRI) [16]. Thus, criteria for prioriti-
zation should be clear and defensible. Several countries
have only partly (or not at all) specified the rationales for
prioritization. In addition, it was not always obvious to
make the link between rationales and priority groups, or
differently stated which rationales were underlying the
prioritisation of which specific group. For example, Bul-
garia specified the rationale "to limit economic losses" but
it was not clear which priority group was prioritized
because of this.
Apart from epidemiological deliberations the allocation
of scarce resources also requires ethical considerations.
The importance of including ethics in pandemic prepared-
ness was addressed during a recent WHO workshop [17].
Only 32% of the countries included in this review
reported to have involved an ethic committee or consult-
ant, and 16% reported the intention to include ethical
aspects in future discussions. While for 13% of the coun-
tries information is unavailable the remaining 30% has
not reported to have involved ethical consultants, it is
unknown if these countries consider including ethics in
the future.
A final note concerns the dynamic process of developing
vaccine prioritization strategies as this might be influ-
enced by e.g. availability of antivirals and developments
in vaccine technology (e.g. the stockpiling of pre-pan-
demic H5N1 vaccines). These developments may change
the perception of policy makers with respect to the need
of defining or updating prioritization strategies.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:236 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/236
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Conclusion
In the majority of the countries the establishment of vac-
cine priority groups, ranking and underlying rationales
are in line with WHO recommendations. The first chal-
lenge in the prioritization of pandemic vaccines is public
acceptability, which can be first addressed by involving
ethical experts or an ethics committee in the decision
making process. In this regard the result may even be less
important than the process. In most public plans the cri-
teria by which prioritized groups are identified are not
easily recognizable. Goals of prioritization need to be
stated clearly and criteria need to be linked with the
groups that are to be prioritized. The resulting concept
should then be communicated as clearly and precisely as
possible including a detailed and unambiguous set of
defined groups that will be prioritized and in which order.
This approach should also aid in the management of the
second major challenge: how prioritized individuals can
be identified and how the vaccine can be administered to
them. Registers may help to easily and rapidly identify
and keep track of HCW and ESP. HRI could be simply
grouped by year of birth, although there may be some HRI
that are not captured adequately by this procedure.
Results of modelling exercises may and perhaps should
play an increasing role in vaccine prioritization. Lastly,
there is a need to build in flexibility and to be able to
change policy intermittently (in the prepandemic phase)
or perhaps even rapidly (in the pandemic) should infor-
mation arise that supports modification of prioritization
strategies. But for this purpose the rationales for prioriti-
zation ought to be clearly defined.
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